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Abstract 
Should legal rules be used to redistribute income? Or should income taxation be the 
exclusive means for reducing income inequality? This article reviews the legal schol-
arship on this question. First, it traces how the most widely-cited argument in favor 
of using taxes exclusively—Kaplow & Shavell’s (1994) “double-distortion” argument— 
evolved from previous debates about whether legal rules could even be redistributive 
and whether law and economics should be concerned exclusively with eÿciency or with 
distribution as well. Next, it surveys the responses to the double-distortion argument. 
These responses appear to have had only limited success in challenging the sturdy rep-
utation of the double-distortion argument. Finally, it concludes by highlighting new 
directions in a debate revived by increasing economic inequality. 
Keywords: Inequality, Redistribution, Legal Rules, Taxation, Eÿciency, Equity, So-
cial Welfare 
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1 Introduction 
Should legal rules be used to address income inequality? Or should the income tax system 
be the exclusive means to redistribute income? This question has existed in some form for 
a very long time. Within legal scholarship it has been around at least since the rise of 
the law-and-economics movement in the 1970s and 80s. The dust had largely settled by the 
publication of Kaplow and Shavell’s (1994) “Why the Legal System Is Less Eÿcient than the 
Income Tax in Redistributing Income,” though the debate has never completely disappeared. 
Now, with income inequality on the rise, and a cause of public concern, the debate shows 
every sign of returning. 
The purpose of this article is to review the debate on the law and economics of redistri-
bution. It does so in three parts. Section 3 traces the debate’s origins in legal scholarship 
up to its culmination in the seminal—and, for many, debate-concluding—article by Kaplow 
and Shavell (1994). Kaplow and Shavell crafted a clear and elegant argument—dubbed the 
“double-distortion” argument—demonstrating why the income tax should be the exclusive 
means to redistribute income. Section 4 surveys the responses to Kaplow and Shavell’s 
double-distortion argument. These responses appear to have had only limited success in 
challenging the sturdy reputation of the double-distortion argument. Finally, Section 5 con-
cludes by highlighting some unanswered questions and pointing to some new directions in 
the revived debate. I believe the double-distortion argument is open to challenge—although 
this still remains to be decisively demonstrated. 
The argument that legal rules should not be used for distributive objectives is primarily 
associated with law-and-economics scholarship. But at least three reasons foreclose any 
attempt to dismiss this position based on this association alone. First, the argument is also 
deeply ingrained within political liberal thought. The position is quite explicitly found in 
the work of John Rawls (1999, 254), as well as many other political liberals (e.g., Alstott, 
1999). The position cannot therefore simply be dismissed as a “pro-market” conservative 
argument. Law-and-economics scholars may have devised the most sophisticated argument 
for using taxes exclusively to redistribute income, but it is not a debate between liberals and 
conservatives. 
Second, it is also easy to misinterpret the debate as one between law-and-economics and 
other intellectual disciplines. Yet, as this review will show, this is an erroneous character-
ization. The debate is better understood as one taking place within law and economics. 
Some of the better arguments in favor of considering equity in legal rules come from those 
trained in economics or who are self-identifed members, and even founders, of the economic 
analysis of law. Even contributors to the debate who do not identify as law-and-economics 
scholars use the same economic tools, methods, and theories as deployed by the opposing 
side (Kelman, 1987, 151). 
Third, it is likewise tempting to dismiss the double-distortion argument because of its 
embrace of utilitarianism. Moral critiques of eÿciency and utilitarianism abound. And so 
it is easy to dismiss an argument that tells us to uses taxes rather than legal rules merely 
because it is more eÿcient to do so. Yet this objection, in my view, also fails. Many, if not 
most, people who would consider the e˙ects of legal rules on rights, justice, or fairness would 
also consider their e˙ects on individuals’ wealth or well-being. That is, a big part of why we 
care about inequality and poverty is because of their consequences for well-being. So if an 
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argument says that using taxes exclusively will improve the well-being of the poor, it is one 
we should pay attention to, regardless of the abstract normative justifcation. 
2 The Economics Background to the Debate in Legal 
Scholarship 
Before discussing the redistribution debate in legal scholarship, I will provide some back-
ground to the debate that begins outside legal scholarship, within economics. 
The idea that income taxes should be the exclusive means of redistributing economic 
resources is deeply entrenched within academic economic thought. One of the bedrock 
propositions in welfare economics is the so-called Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare 
Economics.1 The First Fundamental Theorem states that a perfectly competitive economy 
(so defned) will be Pareto eÿcient. That is, in a perfectly competitive economy, no one 
can be made better o˙ without making someone worse o˙. There may be many—possibly 
infnite—Pareto eÿcient allocations associated with di˙erent distributions of income. This 
is where the Second Fundamental theorem comes in. The Second Fundamental theorem 
says that any Pareto eÿcient allocation of resources—including those with more “desirable” 
distributions of income—can be achieved with lump sum transfers.2 
Thus, a government need not interfere with prices or markets to achieve a (distribution-
ally) desirable outcome. This is quite an attractive scenario. It requires only two policy 
instruments: promote competition and lump-sum taxes. As Hindriks and Myles (2013) 
write, “If this approach could be applied in practice, then economic policy analysis would 
reduce to the formulation of a set of rules that guarantee competition and the calculation 
and redistribution of the lump-sum taxes. The subject matter of public economics, and eco-
nomic policy, in general, would then be closed” (p. 424). It is this policy simplicity that also 
undoubtedly underlies the attractiveness of tax-only position against the use of legal rules 
to redistribute income. The case for that position, however, requires addressing separate 
challenges, as we will soon see. 
The problem is that using lump sum taxes and transfers for redistributive objectives is 
impossible in practice. Di˙erentiated lump sum taxation, as in perfect competition generally, 
requires perfect and complete information. In order for a tax to be lump sum, the person 
on whom the tax is levied must not be able to change the amount of tax she pays by 
changing her behavior (Hindriks and Myles, 2013, 428). Otherwise, the tax will “distort” 
her incentives, and lead us away from a Pareto eÿcient allocation. By this defnition, most 
tax instruments are emphatically not lump sum. Income taxes, commodity taxes, estate 
taxes—the amount a person pays for any of these can be changed by altering behavior. Poll 
taxes—a uniform amount levied on each person—come close to being lump sum, but even 
in this case experience suggests that taxes can be avoided through behavior.3 In any case, if 
1Fennell and McAdams (2016, 1065 n. 42) and McCa˙ery (2005, 817 n. 21) also recognize the link 
between the taxes-versus-legal-rules debate and the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics. 
2I use scare quotes because the standard of Pareto eÿciency has no way of ordering Pareto eÿcient 
allocations, either in terms of distribution or by any other criterion. Making distributional judgments within 
economics requires additional, and more controversial, assumptions. 
3The United Kingdom implemented a poll tax in the 1980s as a source for local revenue. As Hindriks and 
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one wants to achieve a more equitable distribution through lump sum taxes, which include 
transfer payments, they will not be uniform across individuals. Endowment taxation seems 
to be the only way to achieve this objective, but endowment taxation requires knowing the 
abilities of individuals—their endowment—something which is private information to those 
individuals themselves. And individuals do not have the incentive to report information 
about their abilities honestly, if it will be used to their disadvantage.4 Thus, imperfect and 
incomplete information prevents the use of lump-sum taxation to achieve a more desirable 
distribution of resources. 
3 Taxation, Legal Rules, and Redistribution 
The debate about legal rules and redistribution thus starts outside of legal scholarship. This 
section explores the evolution of the debate within legal scholarship, from its origins to 
the development of the “double-distortion” argument. It is important to distinguish three 
separate claims in this debate: (1) should the economic analysis of legal rules consider only 
their consequences for eÿciency, or for equity as well; (2) is it even possible for legal rules to 
redistribute; and (3), if possible, is taxation superior to legal rules as a tool for redistribution? 
If anything, the debate helped to clarify these distinct issues as it evolved. 
3.1 The Origins of the Debate in Legal Scholarship 
Within legal scholarship, the debate begins in the 1970s. The radix can arguably be des-
ignated as Bruce Ackerman’s (1971) “Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the 
Poor.” Although he did not identify himself as a law-and-economics scholar, Ackerman’s 
analysis is straightforwardly economic. 
Ackerman demonstrated that under certain conditions housing code enforcement could 
redistribute from rich to poor. In the simplest, initial version of his model, he assumes, 
in addition to perfect competition,5 that housing supply is fxed. Specifcally, the next, 
best available use of the landlord’s property is low enough to ensure that, even with the 
costs of housing code enforcement, the landlord will not convert or abandon (or destroy) the 
building.6 
To reach his critical result, Ackerman adopts one more condition. He assumes the exis-
tence of a small class of Slumville residents who are not willing to pay for improved hous-
ing. For instance, suppose two types of families live in Slumvilles’s 100,000 residential units: 
Myles (2013) explain, it failed because “taxpayers could avoid paying the tax by ensuring that their names 
did not appear on any oÿcial registers. Usually this was achieved by moving house and not making any 
oÿcial declaration of the new address. . . . This ‘disappearance’ is a change in behavior that reduces the tax 
burden” (p. 428).
4Despite the impracticality of endowment taxation, it has been the subject of a rich debate in the legal 
literature about its normative justifcation, even as an “ideal” tax (see, e.g., Hasen, 2006; Stark, 2005; 
Zelenak, 2006). The debate has centered around the illiberalism or not of taxing highly people who have the 
potential to earn high incomes, but may prefer not to for, say, lifestyle reasons. 
5Specifcally, he assumes rational self-interest, no market power, perfect information, and housing of 
uniform quality. In the initial version, he also assumes perfect mobility within the area where all poor 
residents live (“Slumville”) and no entry or exit outside this area. 
6This does not necessarily mean that landlords are earning even relatively high profts (ibid., p. 1103). 
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90,000 families who would be willing to pay for improvements and 10,000 families who would 
not.7 In a competitive housing market, these 10,000 families essentially determine the price 
for housing. And because they are not willing to pay for housing improvements, landlords 
are unable to pass on the costs of code-enforced improvements to tenants. Thus, the 90,000 
poor Slumville tenants, who do value the improvements, are better o˙ without any increase 
in rent. Landlords, who now face higher costs because of housing code enforcement, are 
worse o˙. The housing code is redistributive. 
Ackerman’s article provoked a small debate about the eÿciency and distributive e˙ects of 
housing regulation. Several critiques of Ackerman’s article appeared (Komesar, 1973; Rabin, 
1983) as did several articles defending or extending Ackerman’s analysis (Markovits, 1976; 
Kennedy, 1987). Notably, not all of those who disagreed with Ackerman’s analysis were op-
posed to his conclusions (Komesar, 1983, 613). Furthermore, all of the participants accepted 
the basic framework of economic theory, including those who identifed with di˙erent schools 
of legal thought (e.g., Kennedy, 1987). Finally, one can see emerging within this debate the 
three distinct questions that were raised at the beginning of this section (i.e., 3.1). 
3.2 Should Economic Analysis of Law Consider Equity as well as 
Eÿciency? 
As we saw in Section 2, the Pareto criterion is deeply embedded in economic thought. One 
normative justifcation for Pareto eÿciency is that it rests on a principle of consent (Posner, 
1979, 489–90). Since a Pareto improvement is one where at least one person is made better 
o˙ and no one worse o˙, who can argue with that? In this sense, Pareto eÿciency is neutral: 
distributive issues are irrelevant to the economic analysis of legal rules. Everyone benefts 
from a bigger pie. 
Yet, as legal scholars above all were quick to point out, few legal rules have such innocent 
e˙ects. Typically, changes in legal rules have winners and losers. Recognizing this, scholars 
advanced a new defnition of eÿciency: Kaldor-Hicks eÿciency.8 Under the Kaldor-Hicks 
test, a legal rule change is eÿcient if the aggregate benefts exceed the aggregate costs. In 
other words, if the winners could monetarily compensate the losers, the change is eÿcient. 
Although distribution remains an issue under the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, the fact that 
winners could compensate losers suggests that everyone could still be made better o˙. Posner 
(1979) developed an “ex-ante consent” theory to advance this view. For example, consider 
two legal rules: strict liability, which favors pedestrians, and negligence, which favors auto-
mobile drivers. For the sake of discussion, also assume that strict liability is ineÿcient and 
negligence is eÿcient. Now, it is clear which rule you’d prefer if you knew if you were a 
driver or a pedestrian. But, from behind a veil of ignorance, not knowing which you would 
be, your best bet is to choose the eÿcient rule—negligence—because this rule minimizes 
ex-ante, expected costs. And, indeed, since many of us are sometimes drivers and sometimes 
7Not that these 10,000 families do not recognize that they would beneft from improved housing, as 
Ackerman notes, just that their poverty makes them unwilling to allocate any more of their scare funds to 
purchase it.
8For a remarkably clear and rigorous introduction and critique to the concepts of Pareto eÿciency, 
Kaldor-Hicks eÿciency, and wealth maximization, see Coleman (1979). 
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pedestrians, we can say that winners and losers are (often? sometimes?) the same. Under 
this argument, Pareto eÿciency’s “consent” attribute survives under Kaldor-Hicks eÿciency. 
In response to the alleged neutrality of Kaldor-Hicks eÿciency, critics showed that it 
could give arbitrary and indeterminate answers, especially when distributive issues—wealth 
e˙ects—were included in the analysis (Kelman, 1987, 141–50). Suppose a factory has the 
right to pollute, with the consequence that the pollution lowers home values in the neighbor-
ing community. Since this infuences the homeowners’ wealth, it also contracts their budget 
constraints, which a˙ects their demand for goods, including their willingness to “purchase” 
the factory’s entitlement to pollute. Given their lower wealth, they may not be willing to 
pay the factory to stop polluting. Conversely, suppose we give the homeowners the property 
entitlement to enjoin the factory from polluting. Without pollution, home values are higher, 
wealth is higher, and the enjoyment of a pollution-free environment greater as well. In this 
case, the amount the factory might have to pay the homeowners for the right to pollute may 
be higher than what the homeowners were willing to pay to get the factory to stop pollut-
ing. If so, homeowners may prevent pollution in the case where they own the entitlement 
but permit it when the factory has the entitlement. In this scenario, either allocation of 
the entitlement is “eÿcient” and we cannot decide which one is superior on Kaldor-Hicks 
grounds. 
The eÿciency-only view could be attacked from other angles from within law and eco-
nomics. Readers familiar with this literature will be aware of the so-called Coase Theo-
rem. The Coase Theorem says that in a world of zero transaction costs, the allocation 
of resources—eÿciency—is independent of initial legal entitlements. Less appreciated is 
what Schwab (1989, 1195) dubs the “Distributive Corollary” to the Coase Theorem: “With 
zero transaction costs, initial entitlements cannot be justifed on eÿciency grounds, and so 
should be awarded on the basis of need or desert.” Stated slightly di˙erently, the distribu-
tive corollary says that although legal entitlements do not a˙ect eÿciency they will a˙ect 
the distribution of resources,9 at least in bargaining environments or “thin” markets (where 
bargaining over surplus takes place) (ibid., p. 1178–79).10 
On this interpretation, the Coase Theorem threatens to upend the entire eÿciency ed-
ifce. With zero transaction costs, the choice of legal rules is irrelevant for eÿciency; only 
distribution matters. This is, of course, the complete opposite of the argument that the 
economic analysis of law should consider eÿciency only and ignore distribution. The rub, 
of course, is that we do not live in a world of zero transaction costs. With positive trans-
action costs, we cannot be sure about the consequences of legal rules for either eÿciency or 
distribution. 
Yet, even with positive transaction costs, Calabresi (1991) argued that distributional 
issues could not be ignored. Transaction costs, he argues, no less than existing technology, 
defne what is maximally feasible in any society. “It follows that any given society is always 
9The corollary has obvious similarities with both older and newer critiques of both the tax-only view of 
redistributive policy as well as law and economics more generally. In terms of the older, see Hale (1923, 
1943). In terms of the newer, see Kennedy (1991, 1998). Schwab (1989, 1195–96), citing the distributive 
corollary, concludes that is “wrong” to rely on the Coase Theorem in favor of any particular political position 
or “ethical view on wealth distribution.” 
10See subsection 3.3 for a discussion of the importance of the di˙erence between contractual and noncon-
tractual settings. 
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or will immediately arrive at a Pareto optimal point given transaction costs” (ibid., p. 1212). 
Hence, no moves from the status quo are possible without making someone worse o˙. We 
are always on the Pareto frontier; distributional issues are inevitable. 
Furthermore, Calabresi fnds Posner’s ex-ante consent theory unconvincing. First, we 
typically do know something about winners and losers, and they are often not the same 
group: “Once we are no longer ignorant, any number of di˙erences may cause us to believe 
that losses or gains to some matter more than losses or gains to others” (ibid., p. 1223; 
emphasis in original). Second, “no such [ex ante] social contract was ever made” (ibid., p. 
1225) and, if there was, who is to say that Kaldor-Hicks would be the standard rather than, 
say, Rawls’ maximin principle?11 
The conclusion is that the e˙ort to turn principles of eÿciency—Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks— 
into neutral standards for evaluating legal rules did not succeed. It is impossible to ignore 
equity on these standards alone. 
3.3 Can Legal Rules Redistribute? 
To be clear then, legal rules are profoundly distributive. No one disputes this, as the embrace 
of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion and the Coase Theorem indicates. Yet some scholars argued 
that there was an important exception. This exception is when we attempt to redistribute 
between parties in a competitive market relationship. When parties are in market relation-
ship, the cost of legal rules can be “passed on,” frustrating the redistributive intent of the 
rule (Schwab, 1989, 1179) and (Polinsky, 1989, 123–24).12 This led Polinsky (1989, 122) to 
conclude that “legal rules often cannot redistribute income in contractual disputes, whereas 
legal rules always can redistribute income in disputes between strangers.” 
For example, in an elegant analysis Hamada (1976) demonstrated that in a competitive 
market with potentially defective products, liability rules (no liability, negligence, or strict 
liability) make no di˙erence to either the allocation of resources (i.e., eÿciency) or to the 
distribution of income. Whatever the rule, the damages caused by a potential defect are 
either part of the implicit or explicit price of the good. In case of negligence, for instance, 
the buyer will be responsible for damages (as long as the seller has taken reasonable pre-
cautions).13 This may make for a nominally low explicit price for the good, but the buyer 
understands that the implicit price, which includes the potential cost of harm, is higher. 
Conversely, under a strict-liability rule the seller is liability for product accidents. But since 
11Hypothetical social contract arguments generate di˙erent standards of judgment depending on how risk 
averse we believe people are behind the veil of ignorance. Risk neutrality yields Kaldor-Hicks; maximal risk 
aversion yields maximin.
12The existence of a competitive market relationship is indeed important. Schwab (1989, 1179): “In 
competitive markets, price equals cost and cost is the minimum possible cost; if the contract presumption 
would increase costs, the parties will write around it (assuming low transaction costs), and cost and price 
remain unchanged. But in markets where price can exceed cost, a favorable contract presumption may 
increase one’s bargaining power. Even if the benefciary waives the presumption, he may receive a greater 
share of the surplus for doing so.” 
13It is typically argued that either negligence or strict liability leads sellers to choose a reasonable or 
eÿcient level of precaution. The existence of competitive markets encourages the same under a rule of 
caveat emptor. Otherwise, a seller who takes an ineÿciently low level of precaution will have higher costs 
than her competitors. 
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the probability of accidents or their costs do not change with the liability rule, they will 
simply become part of the (higher) explicit price of the good. Thus, in competitive markets, 
liability rules make no di˙erence to the distribution of income.14 
Richard Craswell (1991) responded to competitive markets objection in a remarkably 
lucid analysis.15 Craswell says that whether legal rules can redistributive between parties in 
a competitive market depends on two conditions. First, consumers must be heterogeneous 
in their willingness to pay for the legal rule. Second, there must be a positive correlation 
between those willing to pay for the beneft of the legal rule and those willing to pay for 
the product or service itself. Under these conditions, legal rules can indeed be redistributive 
even in competitive market conditions.16 
Consider whether a court should read an implied warranty into every contract for a sale 
of a product. Suppose also that all consumers would pay exactly the same amount for the 
addition of a warranty. Craswell shows in this homogenous case that consumers can only 
beneft from the addition of the warranty if their willingness to pay for it exceeds the cost of 
its addition to sellers. Since the beneft of the warranty exceeds its cost, the net beneft is 
positive. Conversely, if the beneft of the warranty does not exceed its cost, consumers su˙er. 
Craswell concludes that “when consumers have identical preferences regarding a warranty 
or other legal rule, consumers will beneft from the rule if, and only if, the rule is eÿcient 
under a Kaldor-Hicks test” (ibid., p. 372).17 Since there is no confict between eÿciency 
and equity in this homogeneous case, the question of whether legal rules can redistribute is 
moot. 
Compare this to the heterogeneous case. As a simplifying matter, suppose that the 
marginal consumers—those on the margin between buying or not buying the product— 
value the warranty by an amount equal to the cost of the warranty to the sellers. Marginal 
consumers (as well as sellers) will therefore be indi˙erent to the addition of the warranty. 
On the other hand, if infra-marginal consumers (those willing to pay more for the product) 
also value the warranty highly, the addition of a warranty will make them strictly better o˙. 
14In response to this “bargaining around” argument, it is sometimes objected that the costs of legal rules 
should be treated like the problem of tax incidence (see, e.g., Blumkin and Margalioth, 2005, 4–5). Who 
pays for a tax (or cost of a legal rule) depends on the relative elasticities of supply and demand. Depending 
on these elasticities either the buyer or the seller may primarily bear the burden of the tax (or cost of the 
legal rule). Thus, there is no general rule that sellers will be able to “pass on” the cost of a tax or legal rule. 
Yet as Craswell (1991) demonstrated, this analogy is mistaken. A tax merely increases the cost of a 
product or service. In contrast, a legal rule increases the cost but also provides some beneft to the consumer 
(e.g., a warranty), and therefore changes her willingness to pay for it. Thus one cannot treat the e˙ects of 
legal rules like taxes. Put slightly formally, the addition of a tax changes only product price and therefore 
quantity. These can be analyzed as moves along supply and demand curves. A legal rule, in contrast, often 
a˙ects product quality. This induces shifts in supply and demand curves. 
15Kennedy (1981) explores a very similar economic analysis. 
16Craswell demonstrates that Ackerman (1971) is a special case of his argument (see Craswell, 1991, 
380–83).
17Another interesting implication is that “the signifcance of sellers’ ability to pass along their costs in such 
a market is exactly the opposite of what most people suppose” (ibid., p. 372). For example, if consumers 
value the warranty by less than its cost to sellers, sellers will be able to pass on less then 100 percent of that 
cost. But since consumers do not value the warranty very highly, this is a loss to consumers. Conversely, 
when consumers value the warranty more than it costs sellers, sellers will be able to pass on 100 percent of 
the costs. 
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Conversely, if the infra-marginal consumers value the addition of the warranty less than the 
marginal consumers, consumers as a class are made worse o˙. It is therefore essential that 
those that value the product the most (the infra-marginal consumers) also value the legal 
rule the most. 
The analysis gets more complicated when marginal consumers value the warranty more 
or less than its cost to sellers. However, there are conditions when, if the marginal consumer 
values the warranty less than its cost, consumers as a class will be better o˙ and sellers 
worse o˙. In short, it is indeed possible for legal rules to redistribute in competitive markets. 
“The important point,” as Craswell recognizes, “is that such a warranty might be regarded 
as good . . . for consumers as a class even if it were ineÿcient under an overall Kaldor-Hicks 
standard” (ibid., p. 380, emphasis in original). 
In sum, legal rules can indeed be redistributive. And not just in disputes between 
strangers, but within the competitive marketplace as well. 
3.4 Is the Income Tax Superior to Legal Rules in Redistributing 
Income? 
Fierce resistance thus confronted legal scholars who thought the economic analysis of legal 
rules should be concerned exclusively with eÿciency rather than equity. First, the choice of 
standard for eÿciency, Kaldor-Hicks, could not e˙ectively allay concerns about distribution. 
Second, the distributive e˙ects of legal rules could not be ignored—even in the case of 
competitive markets where it was believed that producers could simply pass on the cost of 
pro-consumer legal rules. 
But if eÿciency-only scholars had to concede the frst two points, they began to concen-
trate on the third. That is, even if distribution was a normatively valid concern and even 
if legal rules has pervasive distributive consequences, legal rules are less e˙ective in doing 
so than through income taxes. Note also that prevailing on this point would be an answer 
to the frst question as well. If the tax-and-transfer system alone should address society’s 
distributive concerns, then the evaluation of legal rules could focus on eÿciency and ignore 
equity. 
There are various supporting arguments for this claim, but the literature has boiled 
them down to three. The frst can be called the “imprecision” or “haphazardness” argu-
ment (Polinsky, 1989, 124–27). Redistributive legal rules may favor tenants over landlords, 
employees over employers, and consumers over business owners. But each of these groups 
only imperfectly overlaps with rich and poor, as defned by income. Some consumers, after 
all, are quite rich. Redistribution through legal rules therefore depends on “crude averages” 
(Cooter and Ulen, 2016, 8). Income taxation, on the other hand, can be precisely tailored 
to target the problem we wish to solve: income inequality. 
A second counter argument can be labeled the “bargaining around” argument (Polinsky, 
1989, 122–23). We have seen this argument before in the previous section (3.3). The im-
portant point here is that although legal rules can redistribute, they are not guaranteed to 
do so e˙ectively and may, in certain instances, pass on a signifcant amount of the costs to 
consumers. Broad-based income taxation avoids these kinds of highly-specifc price e˙ects, 
and is therefore a more e˙ective redistributive tool (Cooter and Ulen, 2016, 8). 
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3.5 The Double-Distortion Argument 
There is also a third counter argument, considered by most to be the strongest argument for 
why the income tax is more eÿcient than legal rules in redistributing income. This is the 
“double distortion” argument by Kaplow and Shavell (1994).18 Kaplow and Shavell are quite 
conscious of the challenge that information economics presents to the Second Fundamental 
Theorem of welfare economics. They write: 
[the debate between using legal rules and taxes] would be moot if the income tax 
system—understood here to include possible transfer payments to the poor— 
could be used freely to achieve any desired distribution of income. But income 
taxes and transfer payments distort incentives to work, limiting the degree to 
which it is socially desirable to employ the income tax system to redistribute 
income. (P. 667.) 
They nevertheless are also adamantly clear in claiming, as manifested in their article’s title, 
that “redistribution through legal rules o˙ers no advantage over redistribution through the 
income tax system and typically is less eÿcient” (ibid.). 
This conclusion follows from the “double distortion” caused by legal rules. Taxation 
causes a single distortion to labor-supply incentives, alternatively called the labor-leisure 
decision.19 Taxation reduces the rewards from work, and so individuals reduce their supply 
of labor to the market and/or allocate less time to paid activities and more time to leisure, 
causing a loss in wealth and output. In contrast, a redistributive legal rule not only distorts 
labor supply, but it “also creates ineÿciencies in the activities regulated by the legal rules.” 
Since it is better to have a single, rather than a double, distortion, switching to an eÿcient, 
non-redistributive legal rule will create a Pareto improvement. Through a modifcation of 
the tax schedule, the additional output can in fact be used to make the poor better o˙ than 
they would be under the redistributive legal rule. 
Let’s summarize their example in order to make this claim more concrete. Suppose we 
have a tax regime where high-income individuals are taxed at a rate of 30 percent. Also 
suppose that we want to increase redistribution by using a legal rule that benefts the poor 
at the expense of the rich. In their main example, such a legal rule is a damages rule in tort 
that depends on the relative wealth of the injurer and victim: the damages an injurer pays 
increases with her income (relative to, say, average income). Assume this legal rule transfers 
an additional 1 percent of income from high earners to low earners. High-income individuals 
therefore pay 30 percent of each additional dollar to the tax system and 1 percent to the 
legal system. 
Compare this regime to another regime with an eÿcient, non-redistributive legal rule. 
Their choice is strict liability, where an injurer, rich or poor, must pay for all harm caused.20 
18An early version of the argument is found in Shavell (1981). The double-distortion argument has been 
defended in Kaplow and Shavell (2000b) and elaborated in Kaplow (1996). Kaplow and Shavell frequently 
cite in support of their argument Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979).
19Of course, there may be other distortions and costs as well, such as administrative burdens. But since 
a legal system obviously has administrative costs as well, these are typically ignored in the analysis of the 
economics of taxation. 
20This rule is eÿcient because it internalizes an externality: the social costs caused by harm-inducing 
activities are now made private when individuals must pay for those harms. 
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Suppose also that in this second regime we raise the tax rate for high earners to 31 percent. 
Which regime should we choose? First, in terms of labor-supply incentives the regimes 
are identical. Thirty-one percent of a high-earner’s income goes to the tax authorities in the 
second case, and is split between the tax and legal systems in the frst case. But what a 
high earner gets to keep at the end of the day is the same. So the choice of regimes makes 
no di˙erence for labor supply. 
However, activities regulated by the legal rule will be di˙erent. With the income depen-
dent damages rule, the rich spend too many resources on precaution and the poor too little, 
which causes more accidents. Resources are therefore saved with the eÿcient legal rule and 
these savings can be used to improve everyone’s welfare (making it a Pareto improvement).21 
As Kaplow and Shavell explain, “[B]ecause redistribution is accomplished in the presence of 
an eÿcient legal rule, resources would, by defnition, be saved. With this savings, all indi-
viduals could be made better o˙ (for example, by reducing taxes and increasing payments 
to the poor)” (idid., 668). 
To conclude this section, legal rules may very well be redistributive. They can, in fact, im-
prove the welfare and income of the poor. But there are powerful arguments that everyone— 
including the poor—could be made better o˙ by redistributing exclusively through the tax 
system. This, in turn, becomes an argument for why the economic analysis of legal rules 
should be concerned solely with eÿciency. 
4 Critiques of the Double-Distortion Argument 
Several critiques have been made of the double-distortion argument. None seem to have 
been successful in fully dismantling the claim. This section will try to understand why. 
4.1 Behavioral Economics 
Jolls (1998) applies behavioral economics to the issue of redistributive legal rules. She makes 
two arguments for why legal rules might distort work incentives less than taxes. First, 
people treat certain events (like taxes, which alongside death is the only thing certain in 
life) di˙erently than uncertain events (like accidents). “People will tend to underestimate 
the probability that they will be hit with liability under a redistributive legal rule; therefore, 
their perceived cost of the rule will be lower” (ibid., p. 1662). For example, suppose a 
high-income person faces a tax bill of $10,000. Suppose she also faces a .02 probability of 
causing an accident that incurs a tort liability of $500,000. In expected terms, these two 
costs are the same (.02 x $500,000 = $10,000). Because the accident is uncertain however, 
her perceived tort liability is lower than her tax liability. Accordingly, the tort damages will 
distort her work incentives less than the taxes. This may make the damages rule in tort a 
better tool for redistribution than taxes. 
21Kaplow and Shavell approach the argument a slightly di˙erent way in their formal presentation. In 
place of the ineÿcient, redistributive legal rule, they propose a distribution-neutral adjustment to the tax 
schedule with the eÿcient rule. Because of the ineÿciency in the legal rule, achieving a distributionally-
neutral change requires higher taxes on the rich and lower transfers to the poor to account for the ineÿcient 
levels of accidents and precautionary costs. This generates a budget surplus, which can be rebated in the 
form of lower taxes and higher transfers and generates the Pareto improvement. 
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The second reason Jolls gives for why legal rules will distort labor incentives less than 
taxes is that the costs of the two methods will be attributed to two di˙erent “mental ac-
counts.” “The idea behind ‘mental accounting’ is that people do not always view a dollar 
spent in the same way; it may matter very much from which ‘account’ the dollar is coming” 
(ibid., p. 1669).22 For instance, people probably see the cost of taxes as a direct charge 
against their income. In contrast, the cost of redistributive legal rules may be viewed as 
expenditures out of income. This is because an income-dependent damages rule is caused 
not just by a person’s higher income (as it would be with taxes), but is also a product of the 
accident as well. Tax liability has a sole cause (income) while higher damages have a dual 
cause (income and accident). Jolls also argues that expenditures out of income will distort 
work incentive less than direct charges out of income. If such is the case, there may be an 
eÿciency advantage to using legal rules rather than taxes to redistribute income. 
However, Jolls attaches some signifcant caveats to her claims. She applies her analysis to 
individuals, rather than frms, which may in important cases overestimate the risk of certain 
harms (ibid., p. 1663). She focuses only on tort law, where “uncertainty” is paradigmatic; 
her analysis may not apply to other areas of law, such as contract (ibid., p. 1657–58). She 
acknowledges that the e˙ects of insurance have unclear consequences for her claims (ibid., 
p. 1666). Her argument that people will attribute taxes and tort damages to di˙erent 
accounts is much more speculative than her claim about the underestimation of negative 
events.23 Finally, Jolls also asks whether it is fair to use persons’ cognitive biases to “disguise” 
taxation: “is it proper for government to make of this error in citizens’ perception?” (ibid., 
pp. 1675–76, 1677). All of these considerations cast doubt on the extent to which behavioral 
economics favors legal rules over taxes to redistribute income. 
4.2 Heterogeneity 
Sanchirico (2000b) presents perhaps the most sophisticated critique to-date of the double-
distortion argument. Sanchirico contends that “even in the presence of an optimally redis-
tributive tax, any concern for ‘equity’ dictates that legal rules should deviate from eÿcient 
standards in a manner that redistributes toward the less well-o˙” (ibid., p. 797). According 
22Jolls (1998, 1669–70) gives the following illustration of mental accounting. Suppose you are going to 
watch a movie where the ticket price is $10 and that you also lose $10 along the way. Would you still pay 
$10 to see the movie? Compare this with a slightly di˙erent scenario. Suppose you purchase your movie 
ticket ahead of time and later, just before entering the theater, you realize you have lost your ticket. Would 
you purchase another $10 ticket? Under standard economic theory, these situations are identical. It is either 
worth purchasing the ticket or it is not, regardless of whether you lost $10 cash or a $10 movie ticket (or 
anything else worth $10). However, actual responses to the two scenarios di˙er dramatically. “Eighty-eight 
percent of respondents in Case 1 would still pay $10 for a ticket, but only forty-six percent of respondents 
in Case 2 would buy a new ticket” (ibid., p. 1669). The idea of mental accounting explains these di˙erent 
responses. In the frst case, the lost money and the movie ticket are charged to “separate accounts.” In the 
second case, both costs are charged to the same, “entertainment” account, which is perhaps more than what 
the individual wants to spend on that category. 
23“Much more would be necessary, of course, before reaching any sort of fnal conclusion about the e˙ects of 
redistributive legal rules and taxes from a mental accounting perspective. The empirical evidence discussed 
above (and the other empirical evidence of which I am aware on the topic of mental accounting) involves 
contexts that are quite di˙erent from the one addressed in this Essay, and it may be that mental accounting 
is a highly context-specifc phenomenon” (ibid., p. 1672). 
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to Sanchirico, the missing element in Kaplow and Shavell (1994) is suÿcient heterogeneity in 
individuals’ characteristics.24 For example, while Kaplow and Shavell assume in their formal 
model that persons are di˙erent in their ability to earn income, they also assume that people 
are identical (i.e., homogeneous) in, for example, their ability in taking precautions against 
accidents. Because of this identity, the income-dependent damages rule a˙ects everyone sim-
ilarly, leading only to a loss of eÿciency. However, as Sanchirico argues, if individuals also 
di˙ered in their precaution-taking abilities, an income-dependent damages rule will actually 
increase welfare. 
Kaplow and Shavell (2000b) quickly responded to the heterogeneity critique. Kaplow 
and Shavell answered, “we believe Sanchirico’s claim that our basic argument is subject to 
certain qualifcations is correct but does not go to the heart of whether legal rules should be 
systematically adjusted to favor the poor and disfavor the rich in order to further distributive 
objectives” (ibid., p. 828). Suppose that rich yacht owners are prone to accidents (“klutzy”) 
and that their victims are poor fshing boat owners. Should damages be raised to redistribute 
from the rich yacht owners to poor fsherman? Kaplow and Shavell say, “No.” In fact, the 
legal rule should be adjusted to favor rich yacht owners and disfavor poor fsherman because 
a pro-defendant adjustment helps klutzier yacht owners, who are less well-o˙ than their rich, 
non-klutzy peers. What about the poor? Kaplow and Shavell contend that an adjustment 
to the income tax could compensate fshing boat owners for lower damage payments. Thus, 
redistribution between rich and poor is kept the same while helping helping klutzes within the 
group of rich yacht owners. The bottomline: Sanchirico is technically correct, but “optimal 
adjustments to legal rules have no general, a priori relationship to the notion that legal rules 
should favor the poor in order to further redistributive objectives” (ibid., p. 832). According 
to Kaplow and Shavell, this is not redistribution in the conventional sense. 
Sanchirico (2000a) mounted a rejoinder. He observed that neither were Kaplow and 
Shavell targeting income per se, but rather, like Sanchirico, were attempting to reduce 
inequality in overall well-being. In terms of Kaplow and Shavell’s example (critiquing 
Sanchirico), “if the rich yacht owners are better-o˙ overall [than poor fsherman], then 
Kaplow and Shavell have it backwards. . . . [T]he equity adjustment to the tort system 
should favor the poor fshing-boat owners, and not the rich yacht owners” (ibid., p. 1035– 
36). Nevertheless, Sanchirico’s (2000a; 2000b) own models show that whether legal rules 
should favor the rich or the poor depends on the covariance between income-earning abil-
ity and care-taking ability. It therefore remains unclear whether legal rules should favor or 
disfavor the rich.25 
4.3 Moral and Philosophical Objections 
As economists, Kaplow and Shavell are of course committed to eÿciency and the other 
normative tools of welfare economics—all of which fall within the gambit of utilitarianism. 
One strategy of critique therefore has been to challenge the moral underpinnings of the 
double-distortion argument. One critique targets income (or wealth) and its ability (or 
inability) to serve as a “stand in”—a substitute or functional equivalent—for other values, 
24Avraham, Fortus and Logue (2003) also make the heterogeneity critique. 
25Gamage (2014, 14) draws a similar conclusion. 
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norms, or goods. Another objection attacks more broadly the the moral adequacy of concepts 
such as utility, welfare maximization, and so forth. 
One line of criticism takes Kaplow and Shavell to task for focusing on income redis-
tribution. Such a focus will ignore characteristics other than income that may be desirable 
bases for redistribution.26 When other bases of redistribution exist, legal rules may be better 
equipped than the tax-and-transfer system to address them. Blumkin and Margalioth (2005) 
use the example of race discrimination. Suppose that because of discrimination (rather than 
ability) members of a racially-disfavored group earn less income than the racially-favored 
group. In principle, the income tax could be used to grant a refundable tax credit to mem-
bers of the racially-disfavored group, and calculated to full eliminate race-based earnings 
di˙erences. Yet, “[t]ransfers based on ethnic origin are not common in practice because of 
the desire to eliminate the ability of discriminators to purchase their right to discriminate— 
which seems intrinsically immoral—and for symbolic reasons” (ibid., p. 16). Income is 
inadequate to address all forms of inequity. 
Kaplow and Shavell have two responses to such criticisms. First, as we have already seen 
(e.g., Kaplow and Shavell, 2000b, 827–32), redistributing goods or values other than income 
falls outside the concern of their double-distortion argument. For Kaplow and Shavell, using 
legal rules “to redistribute” means “to redistribute income.”27 Furthermore, they contend, a 
legal-rule adjustment made on some non-income basis is “qualitatively di˙erent from the ad-
justments that we suspect most legal academics have in mind when they talk about adjusting 
legal rules to favor the poor” (ibid., p. 829–30).28 Second, rules that address other forms of 
inequality—as anti-discrimination legislation—may actually be eÿcient and therefore pose 
no eÿciency-equity tradeo˙.29 
Another line of criticism challenges the entire apparatus of Kaplow and Shavell’s nor-
mative framework. Whether maximizing wealth or income, welfare or utility, their funda-
mentally utilitarian approach is said to ignore other fundamental norms and values—justice, 
rights, or fairness, for example.30 In an extensive series of books and articles, Kaplow and 
26See, for example, Blumkin and Margalioth (2005, 3); “people may have preferences for the means of 
redistribution which may have intrinsic value for them”; Lewinsohn-Zamir (2006, 331): “in lieu of the 
simplistic economic premise of source-independence, I submit that the beneft people derive from resources 
depends on complex factors, including the acts that generate the resources and the source from which 
they are received. . . . The same quantity of goods may be more or less valuable depending on the mode 
of its production”; and Liscow (2014, 2502): one “reason for considering equity in legal rules is the goal 
of maximizing social welfare in ways the tax-and-transfer system is unable or poorly equipped to do—in 
particular, when characteristics other than income are desirable bases of redistribution.” 
27Liscow (2014, 2502) recognizes this: “[Kaplow and Shavell] are not ‘wrong’ in not considering non-income 
factors; they are just asking a di˙erent question. The Kaplow-Shavell argument is a non sequitur in the 
context of redistribution for non-income reasons.” 
28Lewinsohn-Zamir (2006) makes a more subtle point about the di˙erence between income and other 
“goods.” Using the example of the warranty of habitability, she argues that income is no substitute for 
a “rat-infested, leaking and broken-down apartment.” Such a dwelling “cannot grant the basic security, 
comfort and means that are essential for advancing self-respect and autonomous action, acquiring knowledge, 
pursuing long-term goals, or developing deep and meaningful social relationships with other people” (ibid., 
pp. 350–51).
29For a discussion of the eÿciency of disparate impact rules, see, e.g., Ayres (2007). 
30Taking a slightly di˙erent line of attack, Lewinsohn-Zamir (2006) accepts a consequential framework, 
like Kaplow and Shavell, but endorses instead an “objective” measure of well-being. Utility maximization, 
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Shavell (1999; 2000a; 2001b; 2001a; 2003; 2009) have responded to such criticisms. Their 
position is that when evaluating legal policies, exclusive weight should be put on their e˙ects 
on individuals well-being, with no independent31 weight accorded to notions of justice or 
fairness. However, discussing such fundamental issues threatens to take us away from our 
present topic. What can be said is that the debate between consequentialist and deontolog-
ical approaches to ethics is unlikely to end soon.32 
4.4 Political Action Costs 
A common, colloquial reaction to the double-distortion thesis is that it fails to recognize the 
political diÿculties of enacting a robust, redistributive tax regime, let a lone an optimal or 
ideal one. Fennell and McAdams (2016) explore this intuition on the scholarly level. 
Fennell and McAdams claim that the double-distortion argument’s prescriptive advice 
rests on a “distributive-invariance” hypothesis.33 This hypothesis states that the overall level 
of redistribution in society is fxed—unique—such that if a court, for example, were to adopt 
a redistributive legal rule, the legislature (refecting the current political equilibrium) would 
o˙set the distributive change through a tax adjustment.34 Endorsing the double-distortion 
argument’s policy prescription “requires accepting the strong assumption that the distribu-
tive pattern in a society will be invariant to the political form of redistribution” (ibid., p. 
1069–70). “If the amount of redistribution is fxed, then it is obvious that one should want 
to accomplish that redistribution in the most eÿcient way” (ibid., p. 1070). Conversely, if 
redistribution is not fxed and signifcant political costs prevent the introduction of a supe-
rior tax-and-transfer scheme, implementing redistribution through legal rules can increase 
welfare. 
Fennell and McAdams convincingly undermine the the distributive-invariance hypoth-
esis. For example, it is diÿcult to precisely and completely o˙set distributive legal rules, 
primarily for a reason often given against legal redistribution: it is haphazard. Also, legisla-
tive inertia—generated by institutional factors, such as veto points or federalism—prevents 
legislatures from responding to legal redistributions. Other reasons against distributive in-
variance are framing, salience, and other cognitive biases. For instance, prospect theory 
suggests that, since people weigh losses more heavily than gains, individuals will resist taxes, 
which highlight the “taking away” of something already possessed more than certain kinds 
she says, assumes that people’s well-being consists solely of satisfying their actual preferences, whatever 
those may be.” The problem with this is that “[f]ulfllment of people’s actual preferences might result in a 
reduction in their welfare, if their desires are based on misinformation, mistakes, or lack of self-respect and 
self-esteem” (ibid., p. 330). However, Kaplow and Shavell (2001b, 984, 1330–34) already appear to endorse 
an “objective” or at least “ideal” measure of welfare or well-being. 
31Kaplow and Shavell (2001b, 968) distinguish this broader standard of evaluating legal rules from eÿciency 
or wealth maximization. Furthermore, their idea of well-being is broad enough to encompass several notions 
of fairness. Moreover, they still adhere to their double-distortion argument which says that, in the case of 
income redistribution, legal rules should be chosen on the basis of eÿciency or wealth maximization. 
32For some of the responses to Kaplow and Shavell’s approach to fairness versus welfare, see, e.g., Dor˙ 
(2001); Craswell (2003); Kornhauser (2003); Waldron (2003); Markovits (2004).
33Markovits (2004) also recognizes and criticizes the distributive-invariance hypothesis. 
34Fennell and McAdams explicitly acknowledge that they do not attribute to Kaplow and Shavell “one 
single, clearly stated proposition but rather a mostly unacknowledged premise revealed in scattered remarks” 
(ibid., p. 1072). 
14 
of redistributive legal rules. Finally, people may assess the “fairness” of taxes and legal rules 
di˙erently. 
However, while Fennell and McAdams’s critique of the distributive-invariance hypothesis 
is convincing, it is not clear how much the double-distortion argument actually depends on 
it. The real issue seems to be whether the political action costs of redistributing through 
legal rules is greater or lesser than taxation. This is implied from their discussion of dis-
tributive variance, which they claim invalidates the double-distortion argument. Suppose 
two di˙erent distributions of income are possible, one associated with a redistributive legal 
rule (Outcome R) and the other with the “closest politically achievable all-tax alternative” 
(Outcome T )(ibid., p. 1071). Using a social welfare function to measure distributive gains, 
then on “some imaginable social welfare function . . . the distributive gains from Outcome 
R relative to Outcome T would outweigh the eÿciency advantages of Outcome T relative 
to Outcome R.” But according to the double-distortion argument, there always exists a 
tax-alternative, call it Outcome T 0, that achieves higher social welfare than one using re-
T 0 35distributive legal rules under any social welfare function: > R. Thus, Fennell and 
McAdams’s result (T 0 > R > T ) can only be true if something—political action or some 
other costs—prevents Outcome T from being as large as Outcome T 0 and these costs are 
greater than for achieving Outcome R. Thus, something more than distributive variance is 
needed to undermine the double-distortion argument. 
Fennell and McAdams give several examples of why legal rules might have lower political 
action costs than taxation. But the reasons given seem just as likely to apply in reverse— 
as many of their own examples indicate.36 Furthermore, the same characteristics (framing, 
salience, cognitive biases, or fairness) given for the superiority of legal rules also tend to 
weaken their redistributive potency. Finally, there are few, if any, institutional di˙erences 
between taxes and redistributive legal rules. Fennell and McAdams frequently invoke the 
scenario of a legislature responding to a court-adopted rule. But courts (relative to legisla-
tures) have no exclusive domain over redistributive legal rules and it is not clear why courts 
would be more receptive to redistributive demands than legislatures. Thus, there are no 
strong reasons why the political action costs of legal rules should be systematically lower 
than taxation. 
Also, the argument against distributive invariance does nothing to challenge the basic 
logic of the double-distortion thesis itself. As Fennell and McAdams frequently acknowledge, 
they distinguish Kaplow and Shavell’s formal claim from a prescriptive claim. Their formal 
claim is the subject of this article: any level of redistribution can be achieved more eÿciently 
through taxes than through legal rules. The prescriptive claim is the policy advice that 
follows from this: “ignore distributive considerations except when setting tax-and-transfer 
35This is because under Kaplow and Shavell’s analysis the tax reform is always a Pareto improvement, 
which implies that welfare will increase for any social welfare function. The choice of welfare function will 
only determine how the surplus for the tax reform will be distributed. If the social welfare function is 
maximally sensitive to inequality (e.g., Rawlsian) it will all go to the poor. If it is less sensitive to inequality 
some will also go to the rich. 
36The “salience” of di˙erent forms and methods of taxation can vary greatly (e.g., “paycheck withholding 
or bundling with mortgage payments” (ibid., p. 1096)). Various forms of tax-and-transfer systems can 
be perceived as more or less “fair” (e.g., cash versus in-kind transfers restricted for certain, “legitimate” 
purposes (ibid., p. 1101–02)). Some forms of tax redistribution may be more politically sustainable than 
others (e.g., universal versus means-tested programs (ibid., p. 1088–89)). 
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policy” (ibid., p. 1058). Yet, as Fennell and McAdams state, they “do not take issue with” 
Kaplow and Shavell’s formal claim (ibid., p. 1057). Thus, whatever the political action costs 
of taxes or legal rules, this still leaves Kaplow and Shavell in a position to say that income 
taxation is a more eÿcient tool for redistribution than legal rules. 
4.5 Tax Distortions 
Another criticism of the double-distortion argument explores its implications within the 
domain of tax policy itself. When raising tax revenue, and even when implementing a labor 
income tax, policymakers have a variety of options to choose from: consumption taxes (which 
themselves can include valud-added taxes, sales taxes, or excise taxes), wealth taxes, or 
income taxes (which could be levied on labor income, capital income, or both). One version 
of the double-distortion argument says that only labor income taxes should be used.37 For 
example, suppose we want to tax yachts, which are purchased only by rich people, as a way 
to reduce inequality. The yacht tax distorts the labor-leisure (or labor supply) decision of 
the rich because it reduces the purchasing power of income, making work less attractive 
and leisure more so. But it also distorts the consumption decisions of the rich, causing 
them to purchase fewer yachts and more of other goods—this creates a second, or double, 
distortion. Accordingly, just like the previous double-distortion argument, the luxury tax 
can be replaced with a new, distribution-neutral income tax, and everyone made better o˙. 
Not surprisingly, legal scholars have contested this application of the double-distortion ar-
gument as well. One line follows closely Sanchirico’s heterogeneity critique.38 Gamage (2014, 
2015) explores another dimension: di˙erences between various kinds of tax ineÿciencies (or 
“distortions”). When analyzing income taxes, most economists focus on a single distortion: 
the trade-o˙ between labor and leisure. But as Gamage points out, the labor-leisure distor-
tion is hardly the only distortion caused by income taxation. In fact, more important is what 
Gamage calls “tax gaming”—tax avoidance or tax evasion. Tax gaming is ineÿcient because 
it wastes resources on avoiding or evading taxes that could be allocated to more productive 
uses. Indeed, especially for “high-income taxpayers, for whom distributional considerations 
are particularly relevant” tax gaming is of primary, and the labor-leisure distortion only of 
secondary, importance (Gamage, 2014, 5). 
Tax gaming is important for the choice of tax instruments. Tax gaming distortions are 
“quite idiosyncratic and contingent” (ibid., p. 4). Indeed, Gamage argues that “taxpayers’ 
incentives to engage in tax gaming . . . are a direct function of only the tax rates of the labor 
income tax. . . . [E]xcise tax rates should have only secondary e˙ects on incentives to engage 
in [tax gaming]” (ibid., pp. 8–9). Therefore, it may indeed be optimal to impose the yacht 
tax as in the previous example. The luxury tax may distort labor-supply and consumption 
decisions, but it can also induce savings by lowering the income tax and the tax gaming 
associated with it. This is underscored by Gamage’s focus on the “marginal cost of public 
funds.” Since the economic costs of a tax instrument increases exponentionally in the tax 
37Specifcally, di˙erential commodity taxation is ineÿcient in the presence of an optimal income tax, and 
uniform commodity taxation is useless. This result was frst demonstrated in a famous paper by Atkinson 
and Stiglitz (1976). On similar assumptions, Kaplow (2006) demonstrated that this result holds under any 
income tax schedule, not just the optimal one. 
38See, e.g., Saez (2002), Sanchirico (2010), Sanchirico (2011). 
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rate, using many tax instruments at relatively moderate rates will be better than one, high 
rate on income (ibid., pp. 10–11, 20). This is called the “tax-smoothing” principle (Gamage, 
2015, 358). 
One response to Gamage is to simply reform the income tax: remove the loopholes, 
di˙erential rates, and other “idiosyncratic and contingent” factors that make tax gaming 
possible. This would improve eÿciency and reduce the need to use multiple tax instru-
ments, which Gamage acknowledges can also increase administrative and enforcement costs. 
Gamage (2014, 366) replies that “tax lawyers, accountants, and fnanciers . . . can be expected 
to devise numerous tax gaming responses for exploiting any conceivable real world form of 
taxation.” But surely the extent of gaming can be made to vary and perhaps reduced sub-
stantially, if not entirely. If not, we could ask whether, if tax gaming is such an inevitability, 
why any tax instrument is inherently less susceptible to it than another. 
It is also not clear how far Gamage’s analysis extends beyond the tax scenario. There is 
a discussion extending his argument to the use of non-tax legal rules (ibid, pp. 72–84), but 
certainly more research needs to be done in this area. Furthermore, since the kinds of taxes 
Gamage discusses are not also meant to regulate other behaviors, legal rules will always have 
additional distortions going beyond those of any tax. This may give little comfort to those 
who would seek to use legal rules, other than various forms of tax instruments, as tools for 
redistribution. 
5 New Directions in the Debate 
None of the criticisms of the double-distortion argument seem to have been able to dismantle 
it. Where does that leave us? For some time, the debate has subsided, leaving Weisbach 
(2003, 439) to declare: “The overwhelming majority of law and economics scholarship looks 
solely to eÿciency to evaluate legal rules.” However, the return of high-levels of economic 
inequality, both in fact and in public consciousness, suggests an opportunity to revisit the 
debate. 
5.1 The Return of Economic Inequality 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the issue of income inequality tended to fade as a matter 
of public policy concern. To the extent that economists discussed rising inequality, they 
spoke of “skill-biased technical change” (see Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004, 587–95). This is 
the idea that income inequalities were being driven by technology, which was expanding jobs 
in high-skill sectors and contracting them in low-skill ones. The obvious solution to this 
problem was simply education. 
The publication of Piketty and Saez (2003) signaled a shift in the scholarly consensus. 
Using tax record data, Piketty and Saez were able to get a much clearer look into the top 
of the income distribution—as precise as the top one percent of income earners (whence the 
slogan). Their data series, covering most of the twentieth century, suggested di˙erent expla-
nations for the rise of income inequality at the end of the century. “We argue that both the 
downturn and the upturn of top wage shares seem too sudden to be accounted for by tech-
nical change alone” (ibid., p. 3). Instead, they suggest changes in labor market institutions, 
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fscal policy, or more generally social norms about pay inequality. Their data also indicate 
that the growth of income inequality is too concentrated at the top of the distribution to 
be explained by skill-biased technical change: “Stories based on the supply and demand for 
skills are not enough to explain the extreme top tail of the earnings distribution” (Alvaredo 
et al., 2013, 3). Finally, the publication of Piketty’s (2014) Capital in the Twenty-First 
Century further cemented the changes taking place in public (and public-policy) discourse 
about the rise of income inequality. 
Unsurprisingly, the change in public discourse surrounding income inequality has began 
to infuence legal scholarship (e.g., Hsu, 2014; Kleinbard, 2017; Kwak, 2015) and, inevitably, 
has revived the debate around the double-distortion argument (e.g., Dimick, 2016; Fennell 
and McAdams, 2016; Liscow, 2014). 
5.2 Areas for Further Research 
In this subsection, I will layout my own views on the double-distortion argument and why I 
believe it comes up short. It also lays out a research agenda for my own future work, and 
one that I hope others will pursue as well. 
The double-distortion argument rests on the assumption that redistributive legal rules 
will distort work incentives and the activities regulated by the legal rules. But why should 
this be so? In fact, it is easy to think of examples where, even if the legal rules distorts work 
incentives, the second—or double—distortion o˙sets rather than compounds the frst. 
Consider the following example of the minimum wage. Assume that there are just two 
households. One household is rich and owns a frm where labor is the only input; the other 
household is poor and supplies labor to the frm. It is often theorized that the cost of the 
minimum wage is at least partially o˙set by increases in labor productivity or reductions in 
labor costs (other than wages). For example, an increase in the minimum wage might increase 
worker e˙ort or training or reduce costly turnover.39 Assume then that productivity is an 
increasing and concave function of the wage; and/or that other labor costs are a decreasing 
and convex function of the wage. We also assume perfect competition so that wages are 
set at the eÿcient, output-maximizing level. The “labor supply” of the rich household is 
captured by the number of workers employed. Since there are just two households, employers 
are taxed and workers receive transfers. 
Now, say we increases taxes on the rich by one dollar, and transfers to the poor by a 
dollar. As is typical, this tax change produces only a “single” distortion: the rich will reduce 
output and employ fewer workers. This makes both rich and poor households worse o˙, but 
as long as the amount of distortion is smaller than a dollar, the poor are still better o˙ and 
inequality is reduced. 
Compare this to an increase in the minimum wage by one dollar. The e˙ect of wage hike 
will be identical to the tax increase in the previous case, except for one crucial di˙erence. 
39There is an enormous literature debating the eÿciency of the minimum wage beginning, frst, with the 
classic argument about employer monopsony power (Robinson, 1969). But more current research empha-
sizes de facto monopsony power arising from labor market frictions (see, e.g., Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999; 
Acemoglu, 2001; Manning, 2003). In such models, minimum wages can reduce costly turnover (Dube, Lester 
and Reich, 2016) or increase productivity by increasing worker e˙ort (Akerlof, 1982) or training (Acemoglu 
and Pischke, 1999). 
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Because productivity is increasing in the wage (or other costs are falling or both), this second 
“distortion” partially o˙sets the frst.40 This means that the fall in output and reduction in 
employment will not be as large as in the tax case. As a result, the poor household is even 
better o˙ than in the tax-only scenario and inequality still falls. Thus, the minimum wage 
is more eÿcient than taxes in redistributing income. 
This is hardly an isolated example. Nor must this particular example be true in order for 
the general point to be valid. In fact, a variety of economic models in labor and employment 
law, antitrust, fnancial markets, housing markets, and consumer protection all demonstrate 
that legal rules can both increase eÿciency and reduce inequality (Dimick, 2016). Now, 
because such rules increase eÿciency in these models, a standard response is that they do 
not contradict the double-distortion argument. Since they are eÿcient, they are consistent 
with the basic premise that legal rules should be chosen on this basis alone. But if there 
are eÿcient redistributive legal rules, then a fortiori redistributive legal rules that are less 
ineÿcient than redistributive taxation are just as plausible. For any of the above-cited 
models, there almost certainly exist parameter values where the legal rule reduces eÿciency, 
but by less than a distributionally-equivalent change in the tax schedule. 
In fact, the double-distortion argument actually lowers the threshold required to justify 
these kinds of market interventions. Typically, the threshold is whether the legal change is 
eÿcient or not. In contrast, given the existence of costly redistributive taxation, the double-
distortion argument suggests that some ineÿciency is perfectly tolerable—as long as it is less 
ineÿcient than the best tax alternative. The debate over the minimum wage is an example 
of this. Much empirical work disagrees about whether the minimum wage induces any loss 
in employment. But, given what we have just said, losses in employment are perfectly 
acceptable as long as they are smaller than what would be induced by a distributionally-
equivalent tax change. 
5.3 Conclusion 
A long-standing debate asks whether legal rules or only the income tax should be used to re-
distribute income. This article has traced this debate from its inception in law-and-economics 
scholarship. Scholars found unconvincing the claims that eÿciency standards, such as Pareto 
or Kaldor-Hicks eÿciency, could legitimately ignore the distributive consequences of legal 
rules. Scholars also demonstrated that legal rules could in fact be redistributive in a variety 
of scenarios, including in contractual or market relationships where it was alleged that sellers 
could simply “pass on” the costs of legal rules to buyers. 
However, proponents of the eÿciency- and tax-only view of legal-rule analysis developed 
a powerful counterargument. This argument is that, even if legal rules could redistribute, the 
income tax is more eÿcient in doing so. Consequently, law-and-economics scholars could still 
ignore the distributive implications of legal rules. Perhaps the most convincing argument for 
this position is the “double-distortion” argument developed by Kaplow and Shavell (1994). 
This article has also reviewed the critiques of the double-distortion argument, which seem 
to have had only limited impact on its reputation within the debate. However, along the 
40Indeed, although productivity increases it is indeed a distortion in a non-trivial sense because it is not 
optimal—productivity is too high from an eÿciency point view and does not fully o˙set the wage increase. 
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lines I have set out, I believe there are still unexplored grounds for challenging the double-
distortion argument, and for giving the greater standing to the distributive analysis of legal 
rules in legal scholarship. 
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